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The COVID-19 pandemic has been the subject of a vast amount of misinformation, partic-
ularly in digital information environments, and major social media platforms recently pub-
licized some of the countermeasures they are adopting. This presents an opportunity to ex-
amine the nature of the misinformation and disinformation being produced, and the theo-
retical and technological paradigm used to counter it. I argue that this approach is based 
on a conception of misinformation as epistemic pollution that can only justify a limited and 
potentially inadequate response , and that some of the measures undertaken in practice 
outrun this. In fact, social networks manage ecological and architectural conditions that 
influence discourse on their platforms in ways that should motivate reconsideration of the 
justifications that ground epistemic interventions to combat misinformation, and the types 
of intervention that they warrant. The editorial role of platforms should not be framed 
solely as the management of epistemic pollution, but instead as managing the epistemic en-
vironment in which narratives and social epistemic processes take place. There is an ele-
ment of inevitable epistemic paternalism involved in this, and exploration of the indepen-
dent constraints on its justifiability can help determine proper limits of its exercise in prac-
tice. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been the subject of a vast amount of misinformation, particularly 
in digital information environments, and major social media platforms recently publicized some 
of the countermeasures they are adopting. This presents an opportunity to examine the nature of 
the misinformation and disinformation being produced, and the theoretical and technological 
paradigm used to counter it. I'll argue that the theoretical approach is based on a conception of 
misinformation as epistemic pollution that can only justify a limited and potentially inadequate 
response , and that some of the measures undertaken in practice outrun this. In fact, social net-
works manage ecological and architectural conditions that influence discourse on their platforms 
in ways that should motivate reconsideration of the justifications that ground epistemic interven-
tions to combat misinformation, and the types of intervention that they warrant. 
Efforts by social networks to inhibit COVID-19 misinformation 
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On March 16 Twitter announced that it is "broadening [its] definition of harm to address content 
that goes directly against guidance from authoritative sources of global and local public health 
information" (Gadde and Derella 2020), and will remove content it deems harmful. Facebook 
announced on March 25 that it would take steps to "...remove COVID-19 related misinformation 
that could contribute to imminent physical harm" (Clegg 2020), and for content that doesn't "... 
directly result in physical harm, like conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus" (ibid.), the 
platform will reduce distribution and add warnings. These anti-misinformation efforts focus on 
removing content that is deemed to be harmful and false, relying on internal moderation teams 
and algorithms for implementation, and external fact-checking organizations for guidance, such 
as those supported by the Google News Initiative (Mantzarlis April 2, 2020), or the partnership 
Facebook initiated with the Italian fact-checking organization Facta to monitor COVID-19 con-
tent on WhatsApp (Pollina April 2 2020). The sheer volume of misinformation has accelerated 
the reliance on algorithmic censorship tools, which are still brittle and prone to errors identifying 
pragmatic features of content, such as when for several days a substantial amount of legitimate 
content discussing COVID-19 was removed by Facebook's AI moderation system. (@alexsta-
mos, March 17 2020). 
Fake News, Misinformation and Disinformation
Efforts to combat misinformation typically focus on the extent to which targeted content is both 
false and harmful, and Levy (2018) argues such content can be described as epistemic pollution - 
which degrades the information environment and interferes with social epistemic practices that 
rely on trust. The pollution model encourages us to think about countermeasures in terms of 
cleanup that aims to restore the information environment to its natural state. This model nicely 
captures efforts by social networks to filter misinformation systematically, as well as Levy's sug-
gested remedies, such as regulating and charging epistemic polluters.
There are important questions to be asked about the ethical and practical challenges this strategy 
faces, but here I want to focus on the problem of information that is deceptive,  harmful, but not 
false, or at least not quite false enough that the fact-checking paradigm would capture it. This is a 
key feature of many forms of disinformation and propaganda (Derakhshan and Wardle 2017 call 
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this "mal-information"), a category some COVID-19 misinformation belongs to, and one which 
can't be combatted directly with fact-checks and moderation tools operating within the pollution 
model. Some forms of disinformation work by polarizing the discourse on a topic, reframing it in 
ways that bring the conversation into what Nguyen (2018) calls epistemic echo chambers, where 
evidence that would correct misinformation is preemptively discredited. By exploiting features 
of individual cognition and the epistemic properties of echo chambers, this kind of disinforma-
tion is highly resilient to veritistic correction (Chan 2017).
The spread of misinformation on social networks has increasingly been the subject of public and 
scholarly attention, particularly where it has involved political processes such as elections. In late 
2019 the Oxford Internet Institute found "... evidence of organized social media manipulation 
campaigns in 70 countries, up from 48 countries in 2018 and 28 countries in 2017" (Bradshaw 
and Howard 2019 p. 5), and found that these efforts have overwhelmingly been focussed on ma-
nipulating political attitudes. Analysis of social media manipulation often centres on so-called 
"fake news", as do discussions of appropriate policy responses, and the flood of misinformation 
surrounding COVID-19 is frequently conceptualized as a problem of fake news. Habgood-Coote 
(fortchcoming) argues that the conceptual imprecision of the term "fake news" functions to cre-
ate an epistemic enclosure, limiting our theoretical resources in ways that re-enforce the authori-
tarian usage of the term to propagandize against legitimate sources of information, and that dull 
the critical tools required to combat it by obscuring distinctions we can make within the category.  
Fake news obscures an important distinction between misinformation and disinformation (War-
dle 2019), and the diversity of functions it performs. Some fake news is propaganda generated by 
state and non-state actors for specific strategic ends, whereas others is produced for economic 
reasons, or even satire. Ordinary misinformation can be transformed into disinformation by hos-
tile actors to further strategic aims. That the strategic aims frequently relate very indirectly to the 
content of the misinformation is a key feature of modern propaganda techniques - it might be of 
incidental interest to promote some particular false belief, where the goal is to undermine trust in 
some institution or hinder the effectiveness of some mode of action (Paul and Matthews 2016). 
Content-based blocking will miss a lot of effective disinformation unless it casts a net with my 
wider reach, beyond that of directly harmful and false material. 
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Polarization, trust, and the social epistemic function of social networks
One of the strategic goals of propaganda is to increase polarization, which creates epistemic col-
lateral damage that is difficult to repair because it undermines networks of trust that connect ex-
perts and their research to broader audiences. The social turn in the study of epistemology em-
phasizes the extent to which epistemic labour is decentralized (Hardwig 1985, Goldberg 2011) 
and connected via chains of testimony maintained by processes which depend in part on trust. 
Misinformation can create primary and secondary damage to the epistemic environment. The 
primary damage is whatever specific harms result from the false claims, and the secondary dam-
age is the disruption of social epistemic practices by overwhelming them, or undermining them, 
such by weakening trust in expertise that might be used to combat misinformation.  As Milgram 
(2015) argues, our epistemic dependency is highly complex and inescapable - if the mechanisms 
that maintain the integrity of the transmission and maintenance of testimonial chains breaks 
down we don't have a backup. 
It is this feature of social epistemic practices that Nguyen (2018) argues is responsible for the 
difficultly of escaping from echo chambers. An echo chamber occurs when the normal corrective 
testimonial processes are undermined, not because, as with an epistemic bubble, dissenting views 
are excluded, but because they are actively discredited. It's not that we don't encounter counter-
vailing evidence, instead we are predisposed to dismiss it, because we don't trust the credentials 
of the source or we are unable to recognize legitimate disagreement because we have adopted 
what Nguyen describes as a disagreement-reinforcement mechanism - potential sources of evi-
dence are preemptively discredited. In a process Begby (2020) calls "epistemic grooming", in 
this kind of unhealthy epistemic environment we are not only manipulated to believe some 
proposition, we also come to accept "... higher-order evidence about the credibility of a range of 
sources that would seek to contradict those propositions" (Begby 2020). In a bad epistemic envi-
ronment, this evidence is misleading. Echo chambers are a useful theoretical perspective on the 
commonly observed paradox that in a world rich with information and connectivity, in some en-
vironments epistemic outcomes are increasingly poor. 
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In some echo chambers, disagreement-reinforcement mechanisms are supported by propaganda, 
especially polarizing propaganda (Sarts et al 2019) and undermining propaganda (Stanley 2015) 
which shift the evaluation context in which specific claims are received. When a politically neu-
tral claim, such as that vaccines don't cause autism, or that COVID-19 is much more severe than 
the common flu, is reframed in partisan terms that connect the discourse to that in an echo cham-
ber, the distorting features of the echo chamber inoculate us against contradictory evidence, in-
voking cognitive biases such as motivated reasoning that will alter extent to which audiences can 
effectively evaluate validity. In fact, exposure to factual information can have the opposite effect 
(Nyhan & Reifler, 2010, Chan 2017), making misperceptions worse, and where we might expect 
that countering misinformation with factual information would improve epistemic outcomes, we 
find the opposite. Even when fact-checking is made available online, it's circulation is highly 
constrained along partisan lines (Shin and Thorson 2017) As a result, propaganda that reframes a 
factual issue in partisan terms can alter the way we evaluate facts and claims of authority. 
Fact checking is also difficult to perform when there is legitimate disagreement between experts. 
For example, as one epidemiologist observes on Twitter, experts working on COVID-19 are "... 
pilloried for updating their beliefs based on new information", and "... our models and predic-
tions about the future trajectory of epidemic [are] deemed politically desirable or 
oppugnant" (@CT_Bergstrom 2020) . This is an example of disinformation that fits poorly in the 
pollution model, involving content that isn't false, and that doesn't mislead by covertly shifting or 
collapsing contexts, but instead explicitly promotes recontextualization that indirectly strength-
ens misinformation and frames the subject in ways that bring it into existing echo chambers. This 
undercuts the credibility of experts generally, and especially those experts who might be used to 
support anti-misinformation efforts. Twitter and Facebook seek to promote authoritative sources, 
but these sources can become grouped into "discourse coalitions" (Hajer 2002) and evaluated by 
their group membership instead of their legitimate authority. We do not usually interpret the ad-
vice of scientists in a partisan way, but in an increasing number of contested domains this is now 
the norm (Metze and Dodge 2016).
One of the themes of disinformation in the COVID-19 information environment has been to 
question scientific consensus on the origin of the virus, promulgating narratives that it originates 
from a bioweapon, disputing the country of origin, and spreading false information about the rate 
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of infection (Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2020). In the US, organized disinformation cam-
paigns have amplified content claiming that the virus is not as serious public health organizations 
claim, and that the high economic costs are a consequences welcomed by some political actors - 
messaging which has a dual effect. It directly contributes to misinformation by spreading false 
claims, but the higher level effect is to politicize the narrative, which in turn enlarges the disin-
formation attack surface by framing the topic as part of partisan discourse. Disinformation which 
amplifies disagreement about the seriousness of the virus, and the political valence and economic 
costs of the response to it, creates a meta-narrative that distorts the evaluation of factual claims 
about the pandemic even when it doesn't address them directly. As a result, countermeasures 
based on the pollution model are likely to be inadequate if they don't push back against this aux-
iliary disinformation, and moreover, by the time a specific false claim achieves enough circula-
tion to receive censure, its tendency to distort can persist by way of mere exposure (Pennycook, 
Cannon, Rand 2017). This is particularly challenging for countermeasures that target a "tipping 
point" (Wardle 2019) for intervention, where the content is circulated widely enough that adding 
higher-order evidence for it's significance by challenging it isn't itself misleading, but early 
enough that intervention can successfully prevent harm. In summary, Facebook and Twitter aim 
to remove and label false claims, and to amplify authoritative sources, but our confidence that 
authoritative sources can correct misinformation might be misplaced in an unhealthy epistemic 
environment where there is disinformation that can make misinformation more resistant to cor-
rection.
Beyond fact-checking - altering the conditions of narrative success 
Interventions in the way we interact with online information, such as "accuracy nudges" that re-
quire users to perform micro-tasks judging truthfulness before sharing content online have been 
shown to be effective in reducing the re-transmission of fake news, and also have demonstrated 
effectiveness at limiting the reproduction of false information about COVID-19 (Pennycook et al 
2020). But this sort of intervention is difficult to implement, and might conflict with earlier find-
ings by the same authors that the repetition of false claims on social media creates an "illusory 
truth effect" which increases our credences in them even when they are known to be false (Pen-
nycook, Cannon, Rand 2017). It is not always practical to provide the information and in-
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frastructure to implement an intervention that shifts the mindset of users before they post content 
to social platforms, but this sort of alteration to the architectural features of digital information 
environments has the capacity to change kinds of discourse that gains influence.
Researchers have observed that the information ecology of social networks allows health misin-
formation to spread rapidly and to resist remediation, and one of the reasons for this is the pow-
erful role that misleading narratives play in changing and reinforcing beliefs (Braddock and Dil-
lard 2016). In a review of the problems facing science communicators attempting to improve the 
quality of online health information environments, researchers find that the narrative structure of 
misinformation makes it difficult to combat veritistically. What's distinctive about narrative is 
that it "...describes the cause-and-effect relationships between events...." (Dahlstrom 2014) and 
provides the audience with context that influences their evaluation of content. Social networks 
"... exhibit novel and powerful uses of narrative and pose numerous methodological challenges, 
requiring collaborative interdisciplinary approaches." (Caulfied at al 2019 p 53), and demand 
unique interventions that are real-time and which involve the development and distribution of 
compelling counter-narratives. One of the reasons narratives are so resistant to fact-checking is 
because they include signals about reliable domain authorities, connections to partisan discourse, 
and disagreement-reinforcement mechanisms such as evidential preemption that make them re-
sistant to rebuttal by experts and fact-checks, and instead, health and science communication 
should ".. recognize the important research around virality in terms of both information dissemi-
nation and interaction with platform algorithms, and to design communication strategies that use 
these findings to their benefit." (Caulfield et al 2019 p 55). On March 12 the UK government an-
nounced an investment in public diplomacy to counter COVID-19 disinformation (Department 
for International Development 2020), with a mandate to develop and distribute just this sort of 
content to counter misleading narratives about COVID-19.  Where the pollution model would 
motivate efforts to remove bad content from the information environment, an ecological model 
would recommend modifying the environment so that better content gains influence. 
There is a tendency to worry that the support of particular narratives, and interference with the 
freedom of users to post and distribute content online amounts risks a form of epistemic paternal-
ism that is objectionably illiberal when it goes beyond blocking illegal or directly harmful mater-
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ial. Moderation standards based on principles of harm and veritism have the attraction of captur-
ing the sort of "shouting fire in a crowded theatre" cases where censure could be compatible with 
an otherwise anti-paternalist attitude, whereas the promotion of counter-narratives would not, 
and the middle ground, such as accuracy nudges have been the subject of signifiant controversy 
on precisely the grounds that they are epistemically paternalist - that they change our mind, 
without our consent. (Hurd 2016)
But worries about this kind of paternalism should be tempered by recognition that there is no 
particularly natural information ecology on social platforms. The circulation of information is 
highly mediated by human and algorithmic moderation, and the behavioural impact of interac-
tion design and gamification. Faced with objections that nudging people to make behavioural 
changes is paternalist, Sunstein argues that the manipulation of choice architecture is ubiquitous 
(2015), and that there are no paternalism-free contexts, an argument which is particularly applic-
able to the digital information environment, where the user-facing architecture of the web and 
mobile applications is highly monitored and optimized to manipulate user behaviour, using 
methodologies such as split-testing. One way to combat the spread of misinformation and to re-
duce the effectiveness of disinformation is to explicitly experiment with architectural and envi-
ronmental conditions that influence the kinds of narratives that gain traction, and attempt to es-
tablish and protect signals of domain expertise.
This requires more ambitious interventions by social networks than these fact-checking efforts, 
but in fact, some of the other actions undertaken to combat COVID-19 misinformation already 
outrun what the pollution model would warrant. User interface design, while highly contextual, 
can have significant influence on user behaviour and information consumption, and interventions 
that highlight authoritative information can have significant effects on user behaviour (Miklosik 
and Dano 2016). WhatsApp and Twitter have both made changes to the way the reproduction of 
content by users is throttled and labelled in the hope this will indirectly inhibit viral misinforma-
tion. Google, Facebook, and Twitter have adopted information design patterns that influence 
users to consume information form sources on COVID-19 which the platforms have made edito-
rial decisions to promote. Both platform expertise (to determine which patterns generate influ-
ence and capture attention a given environment) and domain expertise (to determine which in-
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formation should be made more salient) is necessarily leveraged to implement these policies. The 
reintermediation of domain authorities in publication and distribution processes can support ef-
forts to rebuild the social epistemic environment so that misleading narratives cannot flourish so 
easily. 
Habgood-Coote questions the claim that "[t]raditional media is a ‘bulwark’ against the threat of 
misinformation..." (Habgood-Coote forthcoming p 16) on the grounds that this reproduces au-
thoritarian narratives about mass media manipulation that have become part of the meaning of 
the term "fake news" - it invites us to distrust information on the basis of origin.. This might be a 
good reason to resist the adoption of the term "fake news", and the dialectic that it suggests be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate outlets, rather than focusing directly on content. However, it 
overlooks the social epistemic function of media institutions to maintain trust in the testimonial 
chains linking experts to the public, as what Goldberg calls remote monitors (Goldberg 2011). 
This function is now performed in new ways, with novel failure modes, by social platforms, and 
while for many years platforms rhetorically and legally promoted the view that they are mere 
conduits for the free flow of content, in fact, as the comprehensive and rapid response to 
COVID-19 misinformation demonstrates, they have the technical and institutional resources to 
perform the gatekeeping functions of traditional media. One of those functions is to prevent mis-
information and disinformation from jumping from illegitimate sources into the mainstream dis-
course. In an information environment with rapid distribution and relatively little epistemic fric-
tion, disinformation can be "traded up the chain" (Marwick & Lewis, 2017) from niche social 
networks to mainstream outlets, acquiring apparent authority in the process. 
Social network responses to COVID-19 misinformation have included efforts to remove epis-
temic pollution by way of algorithmic and human moderation, architectural modifications to alter 
the circulation and perception of some information, promotion of domain expertise, and active 
policing of influential accounts. These actions are part of program of epistemic environmental 
stewardship that social networks inevitably undertake, and which extends beyond the fact-check-
ing paradigm. Platform features that modulate the gamification and monetization of content pro-
duction and distribution are regularly altered with significant discourse effects. To the extent that 
they are understood at all, these effects are typically measured within the narrow parameters of 
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the direct incentives of the platform operator, but they have significant social epistemic effects, 
as the COVID-19 case illustrates, that deserves greater theoretical and ethical attention. The edi-
torial role of platforms should not be framed solely as the management of epistemic pollution, 
but instead as managing the epistemic environment in which narratives and social epistemic pro-
cesses take place. There is an element of inevitable epistemic paternalism involved in this, and 
exploration of the independent constraints on its justifiability can help determine proper limits of 
its exercise in practice. 
References:
@alexstamos (Alex Stamos) March 17 2020 https://twitter.com/alexstamos/status/
1240060312520232961
Begby, E. (2020). Evidential preemption. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
@ CT_Bergstrom (Carl T. Bergstrom) March 26 2020 https://twitter.com/CT_Bergstrom/status/
1243252341756669953
Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. N. (2019). The global disinformation order: 2019 global inventory 
of organised social media manipulation. Project on Computational Propaganda. Chicago
Caulfield, T., Marcon, A. R., Murdoch, B., Brown, J. M., Perrault, S. T., Jarry, J& Rachul, C. 
(2019). Health misinformation and the power of narrative messaging in the public sphere. Cana-
dian Journal of Bioethics 2(2), 52-60.
Chan, M. P. S., Jones, C. R., Hall Jamieson, K., & Albarracín, D. (2017). Debunking: A meta-
analysis of the psychological efficacy of messages countering misinformation. Psychological sci-
ence, 28(11), 1531-1546. Chicago
Clegg, Nick (March 25 2020) Combating COVID-19 Misinformation Across Our Apps 
Retrieved from https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/combating-covid-19-misinformation/
	 	  of 11 12
Derakhshan, Hossein, and Claire Wardle. "Information Disorder: Definitions." AA. VV., Under-
standing and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem (2017): 5-12.
Dahlstrom, M. F. (2014). Using narratives and storytelling to communicate science with nonex-
pert audiences. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(Supplement 4), 
13614-13620.
Department for International Development March 12 2020 "UK aid to tackle global spread of 
coronavirus ‘fake news’" Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-aid-to-tackle-
global-spread-of-coronavirus-fake-news
Gadde and Derella (March 16 2020) An update on our continuity strategy during COVID-19 Re-
trieved from https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-our-continuity-
strategy-during-COVID-19.html
Goldberg, S. (2011). The division of epistemic labor. Episteme, 8(1), 112-125.
Habgood-Coote, Joshua (forthcoming). Fake News, Conceptual Engineering, and Linguistic Re-
sistance: Reply to Pepp, Michaelson, and Sterken, and Brown. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Philosophy.
Hajer, M. A. (2002). Discourse coalitions and the institutionalization of practice: the case of acid 
rain in Great Britain. In Argument Turn Policy Anal Plan (pp. 51-84). Routledge.
Hardwig (1985). ‘Epistemic dependence’. Journal of Philosophy.
Hurd, Heidi M. "Fudging Nudging: Why Libertarian Paternalism is the Contradiction It Claims 
It's Not." Geo. JL & Pub. Pol'y 14 (2016): 703.
Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2020) Covid-19 Disinformation Briefing No.1 Retrieves March 
27 2020 from http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/COVID-19-Briefing-Insti-
tute-for-Strategic-Dialogue-27th-March-2020.pdf
Levy, Neil. (2018)"Taking responsibility for health in an epistemically polluted environment." 
Theoretical medicine and bioethics 39.2 (2018): 123-141.
Mantzarlis, Alexios (April 2 2020) "COVID-19: $6.5 million to help fight coronavirus misinfor-
mation" Google Retrieved from https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/google-news-initia-
tive/covid-19-65-million-help-fight-coronavirus-misinformation/
Marwick, Alice, and Rebecca Lewis. (2017) "Media manipulation and disinformation online." 
New York: Data & Society Research Institute.
Metze, T., & Dodge, J. (2016). Dynamic discourse coalitions on hydro-fracking in Europe and 
the United States. Environmental Communication, 10(3), 365-379.
Chicago
	 	  of 12 12
Millgram, E. (2015). The great endarkenment: philosophy for an age of hyperspecialization. Ox-
ford University Press.
Miklosik, A., & Dano, F. (2016). Search engine Optimisation and google answer box. Communi-
cation Today, 7(1), 82.Chicago
Nguyen, C. T. (2018). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 1-21.
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010). When corrections fail: The persistence of political mispercep-
tions. Political Behavior, 32(2), 303-330.
Paul, C., & Matthews, M. (2016). The Russian “firehose of falsehood” propaganda model. Rand 
Corporation, 2-7.
Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2018). Prior exposure increases perceived accura-
cy of fake news. Journal of experimental psychology: general, 147(12), 1865.
Pennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020). Fighting COVID-19 
Misinformation on Social Media: Experimental Evidence for a Scalable Accuracy-Nudge Inter-
vention. Psychological science, 0956797620939054.
Pollina, Elvira (April 2 2020) "Facebook launches fact-checking service on WhatsApp in Italy to 
fight coronavirus hoaxes" Reuters. Retrieved from Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2015/03/11/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-workshop-idUSKBN0M718T20150311.
Sarts, Janis, Bay, Sebastian, Šnore, Guna, Melnychuk, Jazlyn (2019), "Threats to Democracy: 
Technological Trends and Disinformation" in Disinformation and Digital Democracy in the 21st 
Century Retrieved from http://natoassociation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/NATO-publica-
tion-.pdf
Shin, J., & Thorson, K. (2017). Partisan selective sharing: The biased diffusion of fact-checking 
messages on social media. Journal of Communication, 67(2), 233-255.
Stanley, Jason (2015). How propaganda works. Princeton University Press
Sunstein, Cass R. (2019). Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide. Oxford Uni-
versity Press 
Sunstein, Cass R. (2015) "The ethics of nudging." Yale J. on Reg. 32 (2015): 413. 
Wardle, Claire, (2019) Understanding Information Disorder, First Draft, October 2019 https://
firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Information_Disorder_Digital_AW.pdf?x76701
